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Understanding investor behavior isno easy task. The capriciousnessot htiman nature generates aseemingly endless variety of
behaviors that manitt'st themselves in inter-
esting ways when individuals pit themselves
against the markets. One particular type of
behavior that has emerged over the last 20 years
or so is the desire to invest ethically. Our
analysis of why we invest ethically goes some
way toward advancing our understanditig of
ethical investor behavior.
Our empirical contribution is a survey of
both shareholders and prospectus requesters
(who did not make purchases) of Earth Sanc-
tuaries, Ltd., which we describe in Beal and
Goyen [1998a, 1998b|. With a stated objec-
tive of conservation and a financial focus on
stability rather thati maximizing shareholder
returns, ESL provides an ideal opportunity to
gather data to aid our understanding of eth-
ical investor behavior.
At the time the sample for this study was
selected (1999), there were about 7,U(H)
prospectus requesters and shareholders of ESL.
A random sample of 1,4()(J (or 20%) was
selected to survey. Corporations and overseas
investors were excluded from the sample. In ;ill,
943 responses were returned, 788 from current
shareholders and 155 trom prospectus
requesters, tor a net response rate ot 67%.
INVESTOR MOTIVATION
A growing body ot research acknowl-
edges that investors don't behave in the fashion
that traditional finance theory typically
assumes. There is evidence in particular that
suggests individuals do not always act as if they
were homogeneous with respect to mean-vari-
ance optimization. We look at some system-
atic ditferences in the way investors behave,
and discuss some of the literature on ethical
investment.
Recognition of the
Non-Rational Investor
Since the early 1960s, individual investors
have been deemed to be rational. Indeed, as
Statman [20()4a| notes, rationality on the part
ot investors is the basic foundation ot modern
finance. The finance discipline has developed
the assumptions that investors are rational: that
they prefer more to less; that they juggle risk
and return; and that they demand higher
returns to compensate them for taking on
greater risk. In short, traditional theory does
not admit any influences on the investment
decision apart from maximizing returns, given
the individuals particular level risk aversion.
These conclusions are attributable to the
work of several infitiential authors. Research
by Miller and Modigliani 119611 on dividend
policy complements Markowitz"s [1959| devel-
opment of mean-variance portfolio theory.
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whicii sees investors as focused entirely on the expected
returns and risk of their overall portfolios.
As Statman |20n4a] observes, Markowitz's investors
are never reluctant to realize losses on stocks when tax
savings are available and add to their wealth, and they do
not care about dividend policy or ahout the social respon-
sibility of the companies of which they are part owners,
as long as risk and expected returns are uuatTected.
Rational investors do not avt)id investment in tirnis that
operate in areas or with methods that contrav'ene their
personal value sets. To put this simply, personal values are
irrelevant to the investment decision.
Statman |2(l()4a| also argues that hefore finance
became ovenvhelmed by the notion of ratioualit\', investors
were seen as normal w hen they exhihited the typical sub-
jective reasoning ot human nature, rather than the cold
calculations of the rationalists. Snyder 11957] observes
that the '•normal" investors of the day could in fact increase
their wealth by realizing losses and claiming tax benefits,
it only they could overcome their reluctance to make the
losses concrete. Snyder's investors held on to loss-making
investments in the hope that one day they would recover
their values, aud thus they were not inditferent between
unrealized aud realized losses. In addition, by their
behavior, they showed that they did not preter more to
less, as they eschewed the chance to inerease total wealth
by claiming tax benefits trom the capital losses. Odean
11998a|, tour decades later, reports similar findings in rela-
tion to losses.
If investors actually behave as traditional tluance
theory assumes, ethical investment would exist ouly
because it provides the opportunit\' tor equivalent return
at lower risk or provides higher returns for the same level
ot risk as standard tunds. Hence, our first proposed moti-
vation tor ethical investment is that investors are looking
tor superior hnancial performance.
Despite the concept of rationality that has domi-
nated finance for tour decades, iu the last two of those
decades authors have taken delight in pointing out that
investors do not uniformly exhibit rationality. Behavioral
finance draws ou concepts and evidence trom the psy-
chology literature in an efiort to propose better explana-
tions for fmance phenomena.
For example, well documented in psychology is the
tendency ot decision-makers to be overoptimistic, to over-
estimate their own abilities, and to he generally over-
contideut. Men appear to sutler trom these traits more than
women. In the finance world, overconfidence is manifested
in excessive trading (Odean [1998b|). Barber and Odeau
|20(l()| show that net returns fall as trading activity
increases, and that the men in their sample traded 45%
more than the women.
Other examples are confirmation bias (the tendency
to tiud intorniation that reintorces ones original views
and to reject other intorniation), conservatism (inability
to react or slow reaction to uutolding events), anchoring,
and framing.
Anchorittg occurs when a person who is asked to
make a quantitative assessment can be inHueuced by irrel-
evant suggestions made at the same time. Tversky and
Kahneman |1974] report an influential experiment
showing this pheuonieiK)u; many variations have been
reported in the years since with unchanged results.
Framing reters to the way a proposition is presented;
the etMitext of the proposition intluences the resulting
decision. Slovic [1995| summarizes nearly three decades
ot empirical evidence that shows comprehensively that
training changes decisions.
Research in the developing area of behavioral finance
has illuminated many facets of individual investor behavior.
Thaler j 1 y93| focuses on noise iu tinancial markets, price
volatility, overreaction in markets, corporate finance effects
(e.g., preference for cash dividends over capital gains), and
individual behaviors. Noise is the opposite of news, and
it makes up much ot the intormation that fuels markets.
Rational investors may he stimulated to trade on news,
but for every buyer there must be a seller. If potential
buyers and sellers have the same information, then one
side must be contemplating a trade that will prove to be
an error and a trade made on noise.
Why do people trade on noise? Black [1986] asserts
two reasons; First, they trade because they like trading, and,
second, they don't know they are trading on noise; they
think they are trading on intormation. Peterson [2002] draws
on the psychology literature to show that anticipation of
reward (price appreciation) generates a positive aject (emo-
tion, mood, or attitude) that drives increased risk-taking
hehavior and hLiy trading. Then, tollowing the anticipated
event or news, there is a reduction iu positive affect that pro-
duces more risk-averse hehavior and drives sell trading.
Volatility' in the prices ot stocks cannot be explained
merely by ehanges in the present value ot future dividends.
Cuder, Poterba, and Summers [1989] show that large price
movements occur in the absence of important news, and,
conversely, not all potentially price-significant news results
in price changes. Overreaction (and underreaction) in
markets is concerned with announcement effects and the
tendency of investors to over-weight recent information
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and imdervveight intbrniation received longer ago.
Dc Bondt and Thaler |1986] fmd stocks that had
shown extreme pertbrniaiice over an extended period
were likely to subsequently underpertorm (winners) iind
outperform (losers). This research proved controversial in
the prevailing rationalist climate.
Shefrin and Statman [1985] highlight that cognitive
biases aiid emotion affect investors, thus detracting from
the traditionally assumed rational behavior. Normal
investors often manage their stocks individually rather
than as portfolios. They are reluctant to realize losses, as
Snyder observed almost 30 years before, possibly because
they use mental accounts, and selling a stock at a loss
closes each accotmt with a hnality that allows no recovery
ot value and causes emotional distress.
Individual Investor Needs
Lease, Lewellcn, and Schlarbaum [1976|, contrary
to mainstream expectations at the time, report that there
is market segmentation to the extent that individual pref-
erences can hinder the free flow ot capital and interfere with
the establishment ot coherent risk-return relationships
among securities. They isolate five different investor groups
with ditTerent investment goals, investment approaches,
and porttolio compositions. The following year, Lewellen,
Lease, and Schlarbaum |1977[ found that age, sex, income,
and education affect investor preference for capital gains,
dividend yield, and overall return. Warren, Stevens, and
McConkey 1199(1] again report that lifestyle and demo-
graphic tactors influence choices among asset classes.
Nagy and Obenherger [ 1994] investigate the invest-
ment decision processes of equity investors with substan-
tial holdings of U.S. Fortune 5(K) firms, and find seven
summary tactors that capture the major investor concerns.
Investors were asked to rank 34 variables identified as
potentially attecting investment decisions as significant,
considered, or ignored in the decision process. Most of
the variables impacting on decisions were the traditional
wealth maximization criteria such as those concerned
with earnings, diversification, or risk.
Interestingly, the highest-ranked wealth-maximizing
criterion (expected corporate earnings) was ranked as sig-
nificant by loss than half the sample (46.6%). Thus, no
wealth-maximizing criterion was considered important
by more than half the sample. The variable coming third
in the list of significant factors, "teeliiigs for firm's prod-
ucts and services," is decidedly an emotional and non-
rational decision driver. Nagy and Obenberger [1994, p.
65] conclude that investors "use diverse criteria" and "do
not approach investment decisions in a normative fashion."
Finally, Statman |2()()4b[ draws an analogy between
food consumption choices and investment choices. Hoth
ofter utilitarian and expressive benetits. The utilitarian
benefits of food involve nutrition and flavor, while the
most-favored utilitarian benefits of investment choices are
high expected returns and low risk. Expressive benefits
allow people to define and express their values, social class,
and lifestyle choices to themselves and others. It is readily
acknowledged that foods, food supply establishments, and
food consumption places (restaurants) all offer expressive
benefits to consumers as well as vital nutrition.
Statman contends that investments also supply
expressive benefits and that most of the arguments over
rationality and irrationality in investment decisions stem
from the rationalists' unwillingness to acknowledge the
existence and influence of expressive benefits. Statman
consiciers that mean-variance optimizers (rational investors)
view their porttolios as a whole, while non-rationalists
build distinct layers into their pyramidal portfolios, with
low-risk safety assets forming the base and more risky
assets that ttilfill other purposes occupying the upper layers.
Our data support Statmans assertion. About 30% of
our respondents consider that ethical investments consti-
tute 2(t% or less of their equities porttblios. A further 10%
consider their portfolios to be 100% ethical, but the majority
of these respondents held shares in only Earth Santiiaries.
Social responsibility is one such "other purpose."
While socially responsible porttolios are generally private
matters and not proclaimed to the world, they still otfer
self-signaling benefits, where investors reinforce their feel-
ings of social responsihilit\' and generate personal emo-
tional benetus trom their feelings ot having financially
supported good things and having put their money where
their mouths are. This rationale leads to our second pro-
posed motivation for ethical investment—non-wealth
returns.
Ethical or Socially Responsible Investment
Ethical or socially responsible investment (SRI) has
emerged in the last decade or so as a reasonably legitimate
focus of discussion about investor choice. During the 198()s,
SRI was confined to the margins of the investment world
and manifested itself publicly only in the establishment of
a few retail mutual funds, popularly characterized as sup-
ported hy the loony left. Since that time, this force in
investment has grown rapidly in importance with expanded
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expression to encompass retail funds, shareholder activism
at annual general meetings, and SRI streams within pen-
sion funds.
Concomitant with the growth in investor support
for SRI has been the development of academic interest
in the phenomenon. A decade or so of academic interest
has produced possibly thousands of studies in the U.S.,
the U.K., Canada, France, Clermany, Australia, and other
cotintries arotind the world. Hiese studies have concerned:
• Definition of SRI.
• Processes of SRI or use ot screens.
• Historical returns trt)m SRI mutual funds versus
conventional tunds.
• Etfect ot SRI on corporate behavior,
• Identity of SRI investors.
• Why investors elioose SRI.
Rosen and Sandier 119911 report an early U.S. study
ot investors in two socially screened nuitual funds. The
SRI investors in their sample, when compared with other
mutual tund investors (MFI), were younger, white-collar
employed, better educated, and lower salaried. On average,
SRI investors were 13 years younger (39 years compared
with 52 years). 60%) had graduate degrees, but currently
earned 15%) less than the MFls. possibly because they were
in earlier stages in their careers. SRI accounted for only
49%) of their investments.
In Beal and Goyen |1998b| we study investors in aii
Australian company (ESL) that openly acknowledged it
had replaced wealth maximization with nature conserva-
tion as its primary motivation. We find ESL shareholders
more likely to be female, to be educated to a tertiary level,
and probably to a postgraduate degree level than typical
shareholders ot companies listed t)n the Australian Stock
Exchange (ASX). They are professionally employed or
retired, likely to have lower household incomes, high
household assets, and a portfolio of more than 11 stocks.
In Beal and Goyen [1998a| we investigate whether
investors in ESL with its unconventional mission could
really be considered to be donors rather than investors.
Drawing on Cullis, Lewis, and Winnett's [1992] findings
that a distinction may be drawn between consumption-
investors, who gain utility from investing ethically, and,
investnieut-ini'cstors. who gain utility trom the social out-
comes ot their investments, in Beal and Goyen 11998a, p.
219| we tind the vast majority of shareholder respondents
meet the definition of investment-investors—they derived
significant benefit from the conservation activities of the
company. We concluded that "investors are tar more com-
plex creatures than the current state of theory would sug-
gest." Further, investors apply many criteria iti the
decision-making process, although each investor weighs
the criteria ditTerently.
Lewis and Mackenzie [2000a] study the motivation
of more than 1,000 U.K. ethical investors. They tind eth-
ical investors to be middle-aged and middle-income
activists (in politics, community, and church) with a vast
majority holding mixed portfolios. Only 20% held eth-
ical investments exclusively. This U.K. research found eth-
ical investors to be not extremists, but merely one arm of
the investment comnHinit\'.
A consistent theme of the literature reporting SRI
investor characteristics and the rapid growth of SRI in
many cotmtries arotind the globe is the movement of
women into higher-paying jobs (and thus becoming savers
and investors in ever-increasing numbers) and the influ-
ence i>f higher education. It is estimated that, in the U.S.,
about 60% of SRI investors are women, a far greater pro-
portion than in the general investor population.
Scliueth [2003] complements the Australian and
U.K. tuidings with the argument from the U.S. that the
rapidly growing SRI industry there is fueled by better
education, the appointment ot women as senior execu-
tives and directors, giving them access to power and also
the ability to invest personally, and the realization that
socially screened porttolios do not necessarily underper-
fonn the market.
MOTIVATIONS FOR ETHICAL INVESTMENT
Traditional tniance theory and the ethical invest-
ment literature together suggest three potential reasons
people may invest some or all of their funds ethically:
• For superior financial returns.
• For non-wealth returns.
• To contribute to social change.
These motivations are neither exclusive nor exhaus-
tive, but otler a starting point tor advancing our under-
standing ot ethical investors and the choices they make.
Is Ethical Investing a Eair Game?
It, on balance, the risk-return protiles ot SRI funcis
are the sanie as for ordinary tunds, ethical investment can
be considered to be a fair game.
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The relationship between the level of social respon-
sibihty of a firm and its financial performance has been a
contentious topic in both the academic and and profes-
sional literature and the popular press; see, for example,
AH and Gold |2()()2], Bauer, Koedijk, and Otten |2(H)2|.
Chan [2(H)3]. Emery |2(Kll], Johnson [20011, and
Rothchild [1996]. To advance the understanding of the
relationship between corporate social pertormance and
corporate tmancial performance, Orlitzky, Schmidt, and
Rynes [2(H)4] conduct a meta-analysis of 52 studies. They
conclude that, after considering methodological and mea-
surement issues, the empirical analysis does suggest socially
responsible tirms outperform financially.
Aii and Gold [2(K)2] approach the issue hy assessing
the impact of excluding sin stocks on portfolio returns.
They find porttolio returns on Australian stocks would
have increased with inclusion of alcohol and gambhng
stocks from 1995 to 2001. Bauer, Otten and Tourani-
Rad [2()04| use Australian funds data over 1992-2003.
and tmd the returns for SRI funds are not significantly dif-
terent from the returns on a market index.
The empirical analysis ot returns and social respon-
sibility has yet to provide a convincing causal link hetween
the two tactors. A reasonable conclusion, according to
the research, is that SR investments neither over- nor
underperform their iion-SRI counterparts. The single
objective of generating financial returns cannot theretljrc
explain ethical investment.
We argue against the traditional finance theory
assumption ot homogeneous mean-variance-optimizing
investors. The differing levels ot intensity investors apply
in the consideration ot ethics in their investing make a
discussion about comparative returns and purported trade-
offs less important. To better explain the range of invest-
ments that are considered acceptable by different SRI
investors, we need to move beyond the concept of finan-
cial return to a more holistic definition of utility.
Product Differentiation of SRI Funds
As the amount of investment in SRI has increased,
so too have the number and variety of funds offered to
investors. Bauer, Otten, and Tourani-Kad raise the possi-
bility'' that some ethical tunds are really "conventional funds
in disguise" [2004, p. 15[. If this is the case, we would
expect some SRI fluids to hold portfolios that do not ditier
greatly from ordinary funds. SRI funds adopting a best-
of-sector investment strategy would appear to do this.
One Australian ethical investment tund has tlie stated
investment objective of providing "capital growth and
some income over the long term trom investment in Aus-
tralian shares, while maximising the sustainability focus
(economic, environmental, and social) of the portfolio"
("Westpac Australian Sustainability Share Fund" [2005]).
In fact, the maximizing ot the sustainability focus would
appear to be more ot a moderating activity. The fund's
advertising material advises that when necessary "we select
companies with lower sustainability ratings to manage the
overall risk of the portfolio."
This sustainability fund is one of a suite of pre-
dominantly non-SRI options offered hy the provider.
More than 50 of the funds Australian equities investments
are disclosed on its wehsite ("BT Institutional Australian
Sustainability Share Fund" |2004]). Perusal of these invest-
ments reveals quite a number of companies that have
attracted negative media attention for poor environmental
pertormance, especially in the extractive industries.
Funds at the other end ot the spectrum use positive
and negative screens in portfolio selection. One such fiind
discloses the 35 listed Australian equities it holds (see "Aus-
tralian Ethical Equities Trust" [2005]). While the provider
ot this tund does otler a number of investment options, it
oflers only SR investments. The best-of-sector fund above
and this screened fund hold only four equities in common.
This overlap is small, especially given that there are only
around 1,700 companies listed on the Australian market.
The opportunity tor diversity is significantly lower
in Australia than it would be in the U.S., where there are
many more listed companies. Why would fund managers
ofler such a range of SRI tunds?
Cowton [2004, p. 249[ considers ethical funds to
he "retail financial products that specitlcally add social or
ethical goals or constraints to normal financial criteria."
Products are marketed to attract customers, and the cus-
tomers ot SRI funds are ethical investors. Viewing SRI
tunds as products can help us understand the considerable
differences in the investment styles of the screened and
bcst-of-sector tunds and why there is demand for both.
Consider a best-ot-sector fund that holds equities m
the ethical portfoho that are not significantly ditTerent
from those an ordinary fund holds. One would expect
the primary difterence between these tunds to be the
higher transaction costs associated with holding the eth-
ical fund. So, although the risk-adjusted returns would
he similar on hoth porttolios, the ethical investor will
receive a lower return net of transaction costs.
Bateman, Fraedrich, and Iyer [2001] state that con-
sumers use rule-based {or heuristic) processes when they
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make decisions that are similar to those made before. Thtis,
in a world of mean-variance optimizers (with no hrst-
tiiiit' investors) who make their investment choices on
the basis of risk and return, there would be no demand
tor the ethical fund because investors choose the fund
with the higher net return. For unfamiliar decision situ-
ations, consumers use a cost-benefit (or utilitarian rea-
soning) process to make the decision. Again, we are left
with zero demand tor the ethical tiind because ot lower
financial benefits than from the standard tund.
This leads us to ask why investors would support an
additional goal in the investment decision. Auger et al.
|2OO3] use a structured choice experiment to elicit cus-
tomer willingness to pay tor the social product features ot
soap and running shoes, and tnid some consumers are
willing to pay a significantly higher amount for an eth-
ical product. The extent of the ethical premium is related
to the demographic characteristics of the participants.
It we view SRI tunds as products, it is reasonable to
extend the findings of Auger et al. [2()()3j to SRI funds.
Non-wealth motivations for ethical investment are the
most likely explanation for the observed demand tor best-
ot-sector ethical tiinds. To pay higher transaction eosts
tor what is essentially the same product, these customers
must derive an incremental benetit solely trom the fund s
branding as an SR investment.
The incremental benefit is a psychic return (or
expressive benefit, in Statman s terms). This psychic return
bridges the gap hetween tinancial return and utility. Cullis.
Lewis, and Winnett 11992, p. 7| state that the:
extent ot ;in individiKirs ethical lnvt'stnient activity
IS dependent on the size ot the marginal hcnctits,
which may be psychic or more tangible, relative
to the marginal costs ot such actions.
Some would argue that an ethical fund that is not
substantially ditferent from the market index cannot be
counted as an SR investment at all. Sparkes |2()OI, p. 2031
considers that tunds ''not tultilling generally accepted
notions of ethics are at least attempting to meet the eth-
ical concerns of the underlying investors." No matter how
small the ethical component of the fund's investment selec-
tion, there are apparently investors who receive suHicient
psychic return to create demand.
Investors willing to purchase best-of-seetor funds tk
Cullis, Lewis, and Winnett's detmition of consumption-
investors—"those who gain direct utility trom investing eth-
ically" 11992, p. 9]. C-onsump tion-investors maybe motivated
siniply by tashion; they feel good because they are engaging
in an activity tbat is viewed as desirable by their peer group.
Ethical investors in this category are motivated by a combi-
nation ot financial returns and non-wealth factors.
Investing to Improve the World
Our final proposed motivation for ethical invest-
ment is the objective of achieving social change. Those
with the objective of achieving social change can be iden-
tified as iiu'cstnient-uu'estors. Investment-investors gain their
psychic returns indirectly trom the real outcomes of the
activities ot the firms in which they invest (CAIIHS, Lewis,
and Winnett 11992]).
Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner [20011, Kreander,
McPhail, and Molyneaux |2()04]. and Lewis and
Mackenzie |2000b] argue that SRI provides a vehicle tor
social change. We are unaware of any research that doc-
uments systemic social change attributed to SRI tunds.
Shareholder activism is increasing in the tlrst-world
nations, and has achieved some significant outcome (see
"Socially Responsible Investment in Australia 2004").
Rehbein, Waddoek, and Graves [2004] tnid that
shareholder activists are most likely to target large com-
panies and cieal with specific issues. While some SRI funds
are well placed tor shareholder advocacy with their invest-
ments in large firms, fund managers are unlikely to seek
or receive consensus on which social issues the investors
wish to pursue or with how much vigor such issues should
be pursued. Further, Haigh and Hazelton [2004] con-
clude that the focus of shareholder activism has not been
one ot systemic change. They argue that neither share-
holder advocacy nor investment in SRI ttinds can induce
signiticant corporate change.
While one shareholder alone cannot create social
change, shareholders acting in concert with others can.
We see this in the tormation of ethical shareholder groups
in some large companies (BHP shareholders for social
responsibility and Boral green shareholders, for example).
This track to achieving social change is unpalatable to
some as it involves generating financial return trom the
activities they oppose.
An alternative route to social change lies in supporting
a non-governmental organization (NGO) to aet on ones
behalt. Gtiay, Ooh, and Sinclair J2O04] note the increasing
level of activity of NGOs designed to effect social change
via investing. Greenpeace, for example, has sought the
backing of individual shareholders and ftind managers for
resoltitions that reduce environmental damage.
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Tlif major dichotomy in these two alternative routes
tt) achieving social change is the nuiiiber of social issues
that can be addressed by each approach. The SRI fund's
objectives could be viewed as achieving some social change
across a range ot issues, while the NC'.Os tend to focus on
one issue (e.g., Greenpeace and the environment). Thus,
the objective of social change is not achieved in a direct
sense by investment in an SRI fund, but the joint objec-
tives of hnancial returns and some reduction in damaging
corporate activities can be met through SRI tlinds.
We conclude that the main benefits Sl^I fund
investors derive from the social change aspect of their
investment is one of psychic retnrn—feeling good about
not supporting undesirable activities—-rather than from
any tangible external benefit of making significant change.
That is, these investors are motivated by all three of our
proposed objectives, and the social change factor is the least
important in the decision to invest in an SRI fund.
We find a range of SRI products help to meet the
varying levels t)t satisfaction individuals obtain from
investing ethically. Our data show considerable hetero-
geneity in the way ethical investors make investment deci-
sions. We asked respondents if they always consider social
factors in their analysis of investments. Ethical aspects
were always considered by about 24% of respondents, and
never considered by a further 14%, while the majority
(62%) considered them sometimes.
We also hnd considerable disparity in judgments of
company environmental performance by our respondents.
These two questions were structured with open responses
to avoid disclosing our opinions. Respondents identified
273 "good" companies and 114 "bad" companies. Many
of the companies were rated by only one or two respon-
dents, demonstrating that not all investors looking for
environmentally sonnd investments are looking for the
same type of thing.
More interesting is the tendency tor some respon-
dents to rate companies as good environmental performers
while the same companies are identified as bad performers
by more respondents. This phenomenon was particularly
strong for mining companies. BHP Billiton, for example,
was classified as a good environmental performer by 10
respondents, while 189 thought it was a bad environmental
pertbrmer. BHP is held by the best-of-sector sustainability
flind discussed earlier, but not by the screened fund. North,
Ltd., which through its subsidiary ERA owned a uranium
mine whose tailings dam was leaking eflluent into the
Kakadu National Park, was rated by 9 respondents as a
good environmental performer but bad by another 138.
UTILITY OF ETHICAL INVESTMENT
Ethical investment provides SR investors with more
than financial return. Investing in an ethical company or
ethical fund is to a certain extent like investing m fine
art—ill addition to hnancial returns, the investment yields
a fiow of pleasure and even social status.
We can take some tentative first steps toward incor-
porating this aspect of ethical investing into a theoretical
economic framework. There are three ways to approach
the task of placing ethical investing within a theoretical
economic framework:
1. By treating the psychic returns from ethical investing
as equivalent to the gambler's fun of participation.
2. By including the perceived level of ethicality of an
investment in the investor's utilit\' function.
3. By treating the psychic returns from ethical invest-
ing as equivalent to the happiness or well-being
derived from other pleasurable activities. In this case,
w'e can make use of the tools developed by researchers
on happiness.
Fun of Participation
The psychic returns from ethical investments are
somewhat analogous to the/n» of participation that some
gamblers may derive from participating in a game of
chance. Casual observation reveals that some people who
take small gambles (compared to their overall level of
wealth) are quite satisfied with the experience, whether
they win or lose—winning is an added bonus.
The fun of participating in a fair game generates more
utility than would be derived from the financial return on
the gamble. The additioiial utility gained from the tun of
participation is independent of the outcome of the gamble
itself (Markowitz [1952, p. 157J). In the case of ethical
investing, we could say that the utility derived from an eth-
ical investment is the expected financial returns of the risky
investment outcomes plus the utility of investing ethically
and that the latter is independent of the former.
Assuming that ethical investors display some degree
ot risk aversion, simple geometry can be used to display
the ethical investor's utility functions. In Exhibit 1, a risk-
averse individual with initial wealth W,, faces an invest-
ment in a fair game gamble that results in wealth of W-,
if won and W, it lost. The utilit\- that the investor derives
trom participating in the investment depends on whether
the investment is perceived as ethical or unethical.
72 W H Y I ) ( I Wr. INVEST ETHICALIY? FAIL 2ii(i5
E X H I B I T 1
Ethical Investor's Utility Function
utility
Ulihty of a certain outcome
Utility of ethical
investment
Utility ot not investing
Utility ot unethical
investment
Wealth
If tht investment cannot be viewed as ethical, the SR
investor will derive less utility from the investment than
from avoiding it. That is, the tun of participation is nega-
tive .md outweighs the expected hnancial return. It the
investor receives more utility trom an ethiciil investment
than from avoiding the investment, the tun ot participation
is positive atid is added to the expected financial payoff.
An important imphcation of this model is that the
expected utility of the investment increases, the smaller
the amount at stake. Imagine that W^ and WT move
inwat\i anci approacli W |^. At the limit, where W, and
WT are extremely close to W,,, the expected utility ot the
ethical investment is highest. This analysis imphes that
the ethical investor experiences more utility, the less motiey
is at stake in such investments.
This simple model captures the psychic augmenta-
tion to total utility derived by tbe ethical investor inde-
pendent ot the investment outcome. To determine
whether the model has explanatory power—whether it
explains some of the observable behavior of ethical
investors—we must compare the main prediction ot tbe
model with observed beliavior.
The central prediction ot the model is that utility-
maximizing ethical investors will invest nominal sums
{compared to their total wealth) in their ethical invest-
ments. Tbis does appear to accord with the observed
behavior of our sample; about 30% of respondents clas-
sity the proportion (jf ethical lnvesttnents in their portto-
lios at 20% or less. It is also consistent with the U.K. results
of Lewis and Mackenzie |2()(H)a] anci Rosen and Sandier
11991] in the U.S.
C!)ur tun ot participation model provides a good
depiction of tbe consumption-investors' utility tlinction.
where the investor wants to achieve close to a market rate
of return with the additional teel-gt)od tactor trom tbe
label, ethical investor.
Including Ethical Intensity
in the Utility Eunction
A second way to place etbical investment within a
theoretical economic traniework is to make an adjust-
ment to the utility function that modern tinance theory
usually ascribes to investors. In tinance, tbe standard treat-
ment of investor behavior is to combine expected return
and risk (the standard deviation of the possible divergence
of acttial investment outcomes trom expected investment
outct)mes) in a utility tunctioii:
(1)
Because the investor is assumed to like expected
return and dislike risk, H^^ has a positive intluence on
utility, and <T.j has a negative intluence. In expected return-
risk space, the investor's iiiditference curves are upward-
sloping because additional expected return is required to
compensate the investor for bearing additional risk. Tbis
is depicted in Exbibit 2.
To adapt this partictilar utility contiguration tor t!ie
ethical investor, we must insert an additional argument
into the utility function. Tbis might be called the dej^ree
ofcthicalneis of an investment. Letting e denote the degree
of ethicalness of an investment, the utility function for
the ethical investor might be stated as:
(2)
In this case, the indilFerence map based on this utility
function will be described not by curves but by inditfer-
ence planes. Exhibit 3 displays one such plane in expected
return-risk-ethicalness space.
Exbibit 3 depicts the indifference plane of an eth-
ical investor. The individual is indifferent between any
two points that lie on this inditlerence plane. It shows the
trade-offs the investor is willing to make. In accordance
with conventional analysis, the investor demands com-
pensation in the form ot additional expected returns tor
bearing additional risk, but tbe investor also takes into
accoinit ttie degree of etbicalness ofa partictilar invest-
ment. In tbis model, the investor is willing to accept
diminished expected returns it the investment is more
ethical (even if the risk-return trade-otTtbr ethical invest-
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Investor's Indifference Curves
E(R)
Risk
meiits is equivalent to those of ordinary investments). This
may not be true of all ethical investors.
If ethical investors are unwilling to make any con-
cessions regarding the ethicalness of their investments, no
matter how much additional return they could gain, we
remove the trade-offbetween return and ethicalness and
make certain parts of the indifference plane off limits.
With these changes, it is possible to consider a wide range
of behavior under this framework.
For example, investors uninterested in the ethical-
ness of their investments (14% of respondents in our
sample) will inhabit the front edge of the indifference
plane, just like the orthodox investor in modern finance.
Investment-investors will restrict themselves to parts of
the indifference plane that correspond with the level of
ethicalness they are willing to accept and the level of eth-
icalness they can obtain, given the current set of invest-
ment options. This is displayed in Exhibit 4.
In Exhibit 4, the orthodox investor who is unin-
terested in ethicalness again inhabits the edge of the indif-
ference plane (line (I, E). The consumption-investor will
lie a litde farther into the plane, but close to the orthodox
investor. The investment-investor may choose some min-
imum level ot ethicalness, say, A. In this case, the relevant
portion ot the indifference plane would be tlie area ABCI).
Investors whose objectives fall somewhere between
those of consumption-investors and investment-investors
may choose some level of ethicalness that they are willing
to accept, say, A again. In this case, the relevant portion
of the indifference plane will be line AB. It is a simple
exercise in geometry to account for a variety of ditTerent
combinations.
This model is flexible enough to account for a variety
of the observed behaviors of ethical investors. By altering
the shape ot the indifference plane, one could consider
the actions ot ethical investors who are:
1. Interested in return, risk, and ethicahiess, and are
wilhng to make trade-offs among all three (the 62%
of our respondents who "sometimes" consider eth-
ical performance in their investment decisions.
2. Interested in rettirn, risk, and ethicalness. but are
unwilling to make trade-otTs between return and
ethicalness (the 84% of our sample who consider
some companies are too bad to invest in).
3. Uninterested in return or risk (NGO activists, for
example). For this last possibility we could remove
return and risk tVom tht- utility function entirely. In
this case, the investor would attempt to maximize
the ethicalness of his or her investments (subject to
any income or budgetary constraints).
This model is flexible and provides a usefltl frame-
work tor thinking about different types of ethical investors
and their behavior. The downside of this particular type
of analysis is its abstractncss. It does not shed any light on
how to quantify or measure the psychic utility derived
from ethical investing. In order to develop that sort of
model, we must take a further step away from conven-
tional economic analysis of investor behavior.
Incorporating Happiness into the Model
A more revolutionary way to model the heliavior of
ethical investors is through applying some new methods of
happiness research. In both the models developed above, the
type ot utility under consideration is dirision utility. According
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Indifference Plane of an Ethical Investor
E(R)
Risk
Ethicalness
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Indifference Planes for Range of Investor Types
E{Rj
Ethicalness
Risk
to Kahneman, Wakker, and Sann [1997, p. 375|, "Decision
utilit\' is the weight of an outcome in a decision." This means
that investors assess die possible outcomes ot a decision and
accord them weights in their investment decision. Decision
utility is inferred fi-om observing the choices of economic
agents and is then used to explain these choices.
Happiness researchers make use of another type of
iitilit\' called e.xpericmril utility. Experienced utility is sub-
jective in nature. It refers to the flow of pleasure (or dis-
pleasure) that the individual experiences while engaged in
a particular activity. We can use this experienced utility con-
cept in our attempt to place ethical investing within a the-
oretical economic framework.
One particular advantage of experienced utility is
that it may be measured directly and does not have to be
inferred from observation of investor behavior. Recent
advances in measuring experienced utility have been found
to yield accurate and consistent results (see Kahneman et
al. |2l)()4]). One measure of experienced utility that may
be particularly useful for research into the behavior of eth-
ical investors is net affective experience.
Net affective experience is the name given to the
result generated by a survey sort of instrument deployed to
extract a measure of the well-being that individuals attribute
to various activities and events. To obtain a value tor net
affective experience, psychologists use a technique called
the experience sampling method (ESM).
According to Kahneman et al. |2(HI4, p. 4311:
ESM is carried our by supplying subjects with an
electronic diary (e.g. A specially programmed Palm
Pilot) that beeps at nindotn times of the day and asks
FAI I 2IIII5
respondents to describe what they were doingjust
before thf prompt. The electronic diary also asks
respondents to indicate the intensity of various feel-
ings (e.g., happy, frustrated...). These may be aver-
aged to produce a metric reflecting actual daily
experience . . . Net affective experience is defined
as the average of the positive adjectives less the
average of the negative adjectives, for individuals
engaged in each activity.
The key problem is of course how to incorporate these
ideas into a model of ethical investor behavior. Actually, the
problem is solved quite easily. Assume first that ethical invest-
ments yield their owners a flow of pleasure (happiness, psy-
chic return, or experienced utility) over time, and that that
How of pleasure is measured by net affective experience.
The utility derived fioni this fiow of pleasure over the course
of the investment is equal to the sum of the product of the
investment period and the net affective experience associ-
ated with the ownership of the ethical investment:
(3)
where It is the amount of time an individual ( is engaged
in a particular activity /, and fU is the net affective experi-
ence of activity /' (see Kahneman et al. [2004, p. 432]). Now
assume that, besides this flow of pleasure, the individual also
derives ntility from the expected return associated with the
invescment and disiililily from the risk associated with the
investment. In accordance with standard analysis, this part
of the utility derived from the investment can be repre-
sented by a quadratic function of the form:
H = (! + /?)£„ + hLj - cCj," 4^)
' n n i^  \ • /
where £„ anci (!„- denote the expected financial return
and the variance of returns, respectively; h is a parameter
that adheres to the restriction - 1 < /) < 0 when investors
are risk-averse; and r is a parameter that adheres to the
restriction 0 < c < 1 (see Tobin [1958, p. 76[ for some
caveats associated with the use of this particular quadratic
function).
The total utility, U., derived from an ethical invest-
ment may therefore be represented by a function that
aggregates both the experienced and decision utility asso-
ciated with the ethical investment:
U, = ,, + 1(1 + h)E, + hE,' - (5)
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This tuncdon is derived by assuming that the eth-
ical investor wishes to maximize utihty. Total utihty is
represented by a quadratic function of the rate of return
on the investment with declining marginal ui'ilky plus the
net affective experience during the period of ethical invest-
ment. For those who are unconcerned with the risk and
return of the investment, the function reduces to Equa-
tion (3). For the orthodox investor uninterested in ethics,
tlie Hinction reduces to Equation (4).
Variations in the level of ethical intensity will he
accounted for somewhere between these two extremes
by Equation (5). This tlinction captures the essential char-
acteristics of ethical investing as an economic behavior.
Furthermore, the subjective utihty derived from the eth-
ical investment, identified here as experienced utility, can
be measured and quantified. Hence, our first steps toward
a theoretical economic framework for ethical investing
have led us to a combination of psychology' and happi-
ness research with orthodox financial economics.
SUMMARY
We have pniposed three motivations for ethical
investment: financial returns, non-wealth returns, and
social change. These motives arc neither exhaustive nor
exclusive, and one single motive will not explaiii the
behavior of all ethical investors.
The requirement of a financial return is necessary
for an activity to be considered an investment, but there
may be a trade-ort between tinancial and psychic returns
tor some investors. 71ie trade-off for consumption-
investors is expected to be close to zero (total utility is
maximized with low levels of ethical investment in the
fun of participation model) and is expected to vary with
the ethical intensity of investment-investors, as shown
when we include ethical intensity in the investor's utility
function. Psychic return can also be viewed as an increase
in happiness, an approach that would lend itself to empir-
ical testing to improve our understanding of why we
invest ethically.
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